![]() ![]() The Russian deception plan largely succeeded, and the Russians achieved a 12:1 force ratio advantage north of Kyiv. The Russian plan presupposed that speed, and the use of deception to keep Ukrainian forces away from Kyiv, could enable the rapid seizure of the capital. Russia planned to invade Ukraine over a 10-day period and thereafter occupy the country to enable annexation by August 2022. Given the requirements for operational security, it is necessarily incomplete. As the underlying source material for much of this report cannot yet be made public, this should be understood as testimony rather than as an academic study. To ensure that those drawing lessons from the conflict do so from a solid foundation, this report seeks to outline key lessons, based on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff, from the fighting between February and July 2022. Many publicly made judgements on these issues have lacked supporting data or insight into Ukrainian operational planning and decision-making. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has provided an invaluable opportunity to assess the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) and the implications of a range of capabilities for modern warfare. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |